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Media multitasking, the concurrent use of multiple media forms, has been shown to be related to greater self-reported
impulsivity and less self-control. These measures are both hallmarks of the need for immediate gratification which has
been associated with fast, intuitive ‘system-1’ decision making, as opposed to more deliberate and effortful ‘system-2’
decision making. In Study 1, we used the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) to examine whether individuals who engage
heavily in media multitasking differ from those who are light media multitaskers in their degree of system-1 versus
system-2 thinking. In Study 2 we examined whether heavy and light media multitaskers differ in delay of gratification,
using the delay discounting measure which estimates the preference for smaller immediate rewards, relative to larger
delayed rewards in a hypothetical monetary choice task. We found that heavy media multitaskers were more likely
than light media multitaskers to endorse intuitive, but wrong, decisions on the CRT indicating a greater reliance on
‘system-1’ thinking. Heavy media multitaskers were also willing to settle for less money immediately relative to light
media multitaskers who were more willing to wait for the larger delayed reward. These results suggest that heavy
media multitaskers have a reactive decision-making style that promotes current desires (money, ease of processing) at
the expense of accuracy and future rewards. These findings highlight the potential for heavy media multitaskers to be
at risk for problematic behaviors associated with delay discounting – behaviors such as substance abuse, overeating,
problematic gambling, and poor financial management.
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As cognitive psychologists we often measure the ability
to pay attention to multiple stimuli in the laboratory
using rather artificial computer tasks. However, as per-
sonal media devices have become more ubiquitous, div-
iding our attention amongst several media has become a
daily “real-world” behavior. Media multitasking refers to
the concurrent use of multiple media forms. Casual ob-
servation of the behavior of others in our daily life sug-
gests that individual’s differ in their tendency to media
multitask. Individual differences in everyday media mul-
titasking have typically been estimated using the Media* Correspondence: karnell@brocku.ca
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MMI scores have been shown to predict various aspects
of cognitive processing, personality, and affect. Here, we
provide evidence that greater media multitasking is related
to decision-making style in that it predicts greater use of
fast, intuitive ‘system-1’ decision making versus slower,
more effortful ‘system-2’ decision making. We also show
that heavy media multitaskers (HMMs) show a preference
for smaller immediate rewards, relative to larger delayed
rewards in a delay discounting task that measures delay of
gratification. We propose that HMMs have a more react-
ive decision-making style that promotes current desires
(money and ease of processing) at the expense of accuracy
and future rewards. Greater delay discounting has previ-
ously been associated with behaviors, such as substanceis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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cial management, suggesting that the decision-making
style of HMMs may put them at risk for these problematic
lifestyle choices.
Background
As personal media devices have become more ubiqui-
tous, dividing our attention amongst several media has
become a daily real-world behavior. For example, it is
common practice for many students to watch television
and/or listen to music, while reading their textbook,
while texting friends, while checking social media up-
dates. The term media multitasking refers to examples
such as this where there is concurrent use of multiple
media forms to simultaneously accomplish different
goals (Ophir et al., 2009). Why do some individuals
choose to media multitask while others avoid it? Why
do some people seem unable to put their phone down
and focus on the primary task that they are trying to ac-
complish? Do individuals who simultaneously use mul-
tiple forms of media frequently differ from those who
choose to focus on one form of media at a time?
Individual differences in media multitasking have typ-
ically been estimated using the Media Multitasking
Index (MMI) of Ophir et al. (2009) where participants’
self-reports on how much each form of media is used
with each other media form allow a calculation of the
frequency of media multitasking for that individual.
MMI scores allow one to examine the cognitive and per-
sonality characteristics that are associated with media
multitasking and identify those characteristics that can
discriminate HMMs from light media multitaskers
(LMMs). A profile is emerging that suggests that HMMs
process information with less goal-relevant selectivity in
both visual search (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Lui & Wong,
2012) and working memory tasks (Ophir et al., 2009;
Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros-Ward, & Watson,
2013). This difficulty in ignoring irrelevant information
has been interpreted as HMMs having reduced cognitive
control abilities – a supposition supported by the finding
that HMMs have reduced gray-matter density in the an-
terior cingulate cortex (Loh & Kanai, 2014), an area im-
plicated in the coordinated control of goal-directed
behavior (e.g., Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Frequent
media multitasking does not appear to lead to improved
multitasking performance or the ability to accurately
evaluate one’s own multitasking ability. Sanbonmatsu
et al. (2013) found that media multitasking scores were
negatively related to actual multitasking ability on an ex-
ecutive control working memory task even though
media multitasking scores were positively related to self-
perceived multitasking ability.
Media multitasking has also been shown to be related
to greater self-reported impulsivity (Minear, Brasher,McCurdy, Lewis, & Younggren, 2013; Sanbonmatsu
et al., 2013), greater sensation seeking (Duff, Yoon,
Wang, & Anghelcev, 2014; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2013),
more mind-wandering and everyday lapses of attention,
(Ralph, Thomson, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2014), and lower
self-reported self-control (Minear et al., 2013). Further-
more, Minear et al. (2013) observed that HMMs scored
lower than LMMs on items from the Raven’s Advanced
Progressive Matrices, but were also faster to give up on
difficult items, perhaps reflecting their greater impulsiv-
ity, but also possibly a correct assessment that they
could not solve the question, or an incorrect assessment
that they had correctly solved the question.
System-1 and system-2 thinking
The above results suggest that HMMs may engage in
less deliberate and effortful thinking than LMMs. Kah-
neman and colleagues (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman
& Shane, 2005; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010) distin-
guish between system-1 and system-2 thinking during
decision making (see also Gilbert, 1989; Stanovich &
West, 2002 for similar dual-process models). System-1
thinking is fast and intuitive, while system-2 thinking is
slower, more effortful, and deliberate. While the answer
“4” may readily pop into your head when you are given
“2 × 2,” getting 306 when given “17 × 18” almost surely
requires deliberate cognitive effort using system 2.
System-1 thinking can be efficient and correct as in “2 ×
2,” but it also underlies the common, but erroneous, per-
formance seen in common decision-making heuristics
such as availability and representativeness (e.g., Toplak,
West, & Stanovich, 2011).
In Study 1 we specifically look for possible differences
between light versus HMMs’ thinking style using Freder-
ick’s Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005).
The CRT consists of three questions where the correct
answer, that one could readily achieve using system-2
thinking, differs from the intuitive, immediate answer
delivered by system-1 thinking. For example, one of the
items reads “If it takes five machines 5 minutes to make
five widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets?” If an individual applied little to no
cognitive effort and relied on the automatic system-1 an-
swer, then they would likely arrive at the intuitive, but
wrong, answer of 100 min. Instead, if an individual
thought through the question deliberately most would
readily realize that every machine is making one widget
every 5 min, so it would still take 5 min for 100 ma-
chines to make 100 widgets. Therefore, the total number
of intuitive answers provides a measure of reliance on
system-1 thinking, and the total number of correct an-
swers provides a measure of reliance on system-2 think-
ing.1 Low system-2 scores on the CRT have been shown
to predict increased use of decision-making heuristics
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ness to delay gratification (Frederick, 2005). The CRT
has also been referred to as a “potent measure of the
tendency toward miserly processing” (Toplak et al.,
2011, p. 1275). The CRT score is generally treated as trait-
variable, reflecting an individual’s disposition and/or ability
(see Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014 for a discussion). This is
supported by studies showing that CRT scores relate to
traits and dispositions, such as gender (Frederick, 2005;
Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler,
& Fugelsang, 2016), scores on the Need for Cognition Scale
(Frederick, 2005; Pennycook et al., 2016), and personality
facets and real-world decision-making styles (Juanchich,
Dewberry, Sirota, & Narendran, 2016), as well as ability
measures such as Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) scores
(Frederick, 2005), working memory scores, and perform-
ance on various subscales of the Wechsler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence (Toplak et al., 2011). Based on previous
findings of greater self-reported impulsivity and reduced
cognitive control for HMMs, we predict that HMMs will
have fewer correct answers, and more intuitive answers, on
the CRT than LMMs, reflective of a more intuitive, less ef-
fortful, system-1 processing style.
Delay of gratification
Lower system-2 scores on the CRT predict reduced
delay of gratification (Frederick, 2005). Delay of gratifi-
cation is the ability to forego immediate gratification in
order to receive a larger reward at a later time (Mischel,
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Delay of gratification is a
form of self-regulation that has been shown to have im-
portant life outcomes. For example, preschool children
who were able to delay gratification and resist eating one
marshmallow immediately in order to receive two
marshmallows several minutes later were rated 10 years
later by their parents as having greater academic and so-
cial competence, a greater ability to plan, think ahead,
and listen attentively, as well as being better at managing
frustration and stress (Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988).
One common way that delay of gratification is measured
in adults is through a paradigm called delay discounting
(e.g., Odum, 2011). Delay discounting refers to the extent
to which an individual’s perceived value of a reward de-
clines as the delay until its receipt increases (Mazur,
1987). Participants are presented with choices between
small, immediate rewards and larger, delayed rewards.
Those who have higher discounting rates (i.e., who
discount future rewards more and, therefore, have a
higher preference for immediate gratification) are
thought to be more impulsive and to have less self-
control (e.g., MacKillop et al., 2011). Indeed, delay
discounting is associated with many important behav-
ioral life outcomes including problematic gambling
(Alessi & Petry, 2003), obesity (Epstein, Salvy, Carr,Dearing, & Bickel, 2010; Zhang & Rashad, 2008), poor fi-
nancial management (Bidewell, Griffin, & Hesketh, 2006),
and dependence on substances such as opioids
(Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997), alcohol
(Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998), nicotine (Baker, Johnson, &
Bickel, 2003), and marijuana (Johnson et al., 2010).
Delay discounting can also predict future substance
misuse (e.g., Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009) and future
cessation/treatment success (e.g., Krishnan-Sarin et al.,
2007; Tucker, Vuchinich, & Rippens, 2002).
In Study 2 we look for possible differences in delay of
gratification in LMMs and HMMs. Because impulsivity and
self-control are important factors in delay discounting
(e.g., Frederick, 2005), and greater media multitasking use
has been shown to predict greater impulsivity and reduced
self-control (e.g., Minear et al., 2013; Sanbonmatsu et al.,
2013), we hypothesize that HMMs would show a re-





Participants were 501 undergraduate students (417 were fe-
male) ranging in age from 17 years to 43 years (M = 19.63
years) who received research participation credit. Partici-
pants were run in person individually or in small groups.
Some participants completed additional computer tasks or
questionnaires that are not the focus of the present investi-
gation. Of these, 206 also participated in Study 2. All partic-
ipants completed the CRT prior to the MMI. The stopping
rule was to run as many participants as possible “before the
end of the winter term,” with a minimum goal of 400
participants. Data was not analyzed until the full N of
501 was achieved.
MMI scores could not be calculated for 45 of the par-
ticipants who failed to complete the MMI correctly or
fully (typically leaving one side of the diagonal blank in
the matrix) and these were removed from the dataset.
Two of the remaining participants failed to complete the
CRT. Of the remaining participants, 303 also completed
the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995)
after the CRT and before the MMI.
Measures
Media Multitasking Index – MMI The MMI (Ophir
et al., 2009) was used to measure an individual’s level of
trait multitasking. Participants first indicated how many
hours a week they use 12 different forms of media (e.g.,
video games, email, television), and then for each of the
12 types of media they reported how often they use each
of the other 11 forms of media while using that form pri-
marily. The allowable responses included: 0 = never, 1 = a
little of the time, 2 = some of the time, to 3 = most of the
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vided by 3, then added, and this value was then multiplied
by the total number of hours per week using that medium.
These products were then added together and divided by
the total number of hours per week using all media to get
an overall MMI score where a higher MMI score repre-
sents greater chronic media multitasking.
Cognitive Reflection Test – CRT The CRT (Frederick,
2005) contains three logic questions that suggest an im-
mediately intuitive, but wrong, answer. The correct an-
swer can be found quite readily once deliberate logical
thought is applied. Participants received all three ques-
tions on a single page titled “Decision Making Question-
naire.” They were not given any instructions about how
to answer the questions or about how long to take, and
were simply told to provide the correct answer to the
question in the blank space provided beside each ques-
tion. The CRT correct score was calculated as the num-
ber of items out of three that were answered correctly.
The CRT intuitive score was calculated as the number of
items out of three that were answered with the intuitive
but wrong answer.
Barratt Impulsivity Scale – BIS-11 The BIS-11 (Patton
et al., 1995) is a widely used self-report questionnaire de-
signed to measure impulsivity. It contains 30 statements
(e.g., “I do things without thinking”) and participants
indicated the extent to which the statement generally
applies to them using a 4-point Likert scale that varies
from “rarely/never” to “almost always/always.” After re-
coding reversed items, scores were summed to get an
overall BIS score and BIS subscale scores for the three
impulsivity factors: Attention, Motor, and Nonplanning.
Results
The N, mean (M), range, and standard deviation (SD)
are provided in Table 1 for all measures. MMI and BIS
scores showed good variability and were normally dis-
tributed. For the CRT, overall, participants gave few cor-
rect answers and many intuitive ones. However, each of
the four possible scores (0 to 3) was observed by at least
27 participants for each measure so individual di-
fferences were still evident. The typical sex differenceTable 1 Descriptive data for Study-1 measures
Measure N M SD Minimum Maximum
MMI score 456 4.69 1.87 .11 10.08
CRT correct 454 0.42 .87 0 3
CRT intuitive 454 2.24 .95 0 3
BIS (impulsivity) 303 58.02 11.25 33 90
MMI Media Multitasking Index, CRT Cognitive Reflection Test, BIS Barratt
Impulsivity Scale(Frederick, 2005; Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Pennycook
et al., 2016) was observed for CRT scores, where male par-
ticipants gave significantly more correct answers (M = 0.88)
than female participants (M = 0.41), t(496) = 4.59, p <
.001, d = .513, and fewer intuitive answers (M = 1.83)
than female participants (M = 2.32), t(496) = 4.29, p <
.001, d = .494.
As hypothesized, greater MMI scores were associated
with fewer items correct on the CRT, r(455) = −.17, p <
.001, and greater use of more intuitive wrong answers,
r(455) = .17, p < .001, even when controlling for number
of hours of media use per week (both ps = .001), and
when controlling for sex of participant (both ps < .001).
Also, as hypothesized, higher MMI scores predicted
greater impulsivity with overall BIS scores r(303) = .24, p
< .001, and on each of the Attention, Motor, and Non-
planning factors of the BIS (all ps < .01). Furthermore,
controlling for BIS scores did not remove the relation-
ships between MMI scores and CRT correct (partial r =
−.17, p = .003), or CRT intuitive (partial r = .13, p < .05),
measures, which would be expected given the null rela-
tionship observed here between BIS scores and CRT
measures, r(322) = −.04, p = .48 for CRT correct, and
r(322) = −.02, p = .70 for CRT intuitive (see Table 2).
Given that only four scores were possible on the CRT
(0, 1, 2 or 3 correct), correct CRT score can also be used
as an independent grouping variable with MMI score as
the dependent variable. A between-participant one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant effect
of CRT group, where MMI scores differed significantly
across CRT groups, F(3,451) = 4.92, p = .002, partial 2 =
.032, see Fig. 1a. Follow-up paired comparisons with the
Bonferroni alpha correction showed a significantly higher
MMI score for those with a correct CRT score of 0 than
those with a correct CRT score of 3 (p < .05).
Extreme groups’ comparisons
Individuals scoring more than 1 SD above the mean
(i.e., MMI scores higher than 6.56) were classified as
HMMs (N = 73) and individuals scoring more than 1 SD
below the mean (i.e., MMI scores lower than 2.80) were
classified as LMMs (N = 75); an approach that has been
popular when using the MMI (e.g., Cain & Mitroff, 2011,
Minear et al., 2013; Ophir et al., 2009).Table 2 Correlations amongst Study-1 measures
Measure 1 2 3
1. MMI score -
2. CRT correct −.17 -
3. CRT intuitive .17 −.83 -
4. BIS (impulsivity) .24 −.02 −.02
MMI Media Multitasking Index, CRT Cognitive Reflection Test, BIS Barratt
Impulsivity Scale
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significantly lower overall on the CRT correct than did
LMMs, t(145) = 2.73, p = .007, d = .457, and provided
significantly more intuitive wrong answers than did
LMMs, t(145) = 2.88, p = .005, d = .478 (see Fig. 1b, c).
HMMs also showed significantly greater self-reported
impulsivity on the BIS than LMMs, t(102) = 3.49, p <
.001, d = .693. These results provide the first evidence
that HMMs rely more on a fast and intuitive system-1
processing style.Study 2
Methods
Participants were 206 Brock University undergraduate
students (158 were female) ranging in age from 17 years
to 43 years (M = 19.74 years) who participated voluntar-
ily in this study in exchange for research credit. All par-
ticipants were run in small groups and completed the
delay discounting measure prior to the MMI. Instruc-
tions, completion, and scoring of the MMI were the
same as in Study 1. The stopping rule was to run 200
participants, and experimental timeslots were posted to
approximate this number with a few extra for safety.Table 3 Descriptive data for Study-2 measures
Measure N M SD Minimum Maximum
MMI score 150 4.89 1.93 .87 9.68
Delay discounting (log k) 150 −2.69 .86 −4.25 −.70
MMI Media Multitasking Index. Delay discounting mean represents log-transformed
k (i.e., the degree to which each additional day decreases the perceived value of a
$100 CAD rewardDelay discounting
Each participant was presented with a series of hypo-
thetical scenarios of monetary gains where they indi-
cated their preference for either a small, immediate
reward or a larger, delayed reward. It should be noted
that delay discounting research often employs hypothet-
ical rewards, and that past research has found no signifi-
cant differences in using hypothetical versus actual
rewards (e.g., Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003;
Madden et al., 2004).
The amount of the delayed reward remained fixed at
$100 Canadian dollars (CAD) while the values of the im-
mediate reward were $1, $2.50, $5, $7.50, $10, $15, $20,
$25, $30, $25, $40, $45, $50, $55, $60, $65, $70, $75,
$80, $85, $90, $92.50, $95, $97.50, and $99 CAD. The
delay period for the delayed reward varied: ranging from
1 day, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, and
5 years. For each delay period, participants were asked
to indicate their preference between each immediate
amount compared to the delayed amount by circling
which reward they preferred. There were 175 trials in
total (25 immediate reward amounts × 7 delay periods).
Immediate amounts were presented in fixed descending
order from the largest immediate reward to the smallest
such that pairs of options were presented vertically down
the page. Participants were presented with each delay in
order of smallest delay to the largest, with each delay pre-
sented on a separate page. For each delay period, the low-
est dollar value that a participant would take immediately,as opposed to waiting for the $100, was calculated as that
participant’s switch point.
The decline in preference for the delayed rewards can
be expressed by the following function developed by
Mazur (1987):
V ¼ A= 1þ kDð Þ;
where the discounted value of the delayed reward (V),
the delayed reward amount (A), and the delay in days (D)
can all be used to estimate k which is equal to the slope of
the delay curve and thereby describes how much value is
affected by delay. Based on the above function, a curve
was fitted to the 7 data points per participant (one for
each time point), such that the slope parameter, k, was
obtained. If k is relatively large, then the effect of delay (D)
on degrading value is bigger than if k is small. A higher
slope value (greater k) represents steeper discounting (a
more rapid decrease in the value of a reward with increas-
ing time, reflecting less delay of gratification) and this is
used here as the dependent variable.2
Results
Descriptive statistics for both measures can be found in
Table 3. Twenty-two participants were excluded from
the dataset due to incorrectly filling out the MMI (typic-
ally a failure to complete both sides of the diagonal in
the matrix). An additional 34 participants were excluded
for failing to meet the Johnson and Bickel (2008) inclu-
sion criteria for delay discounting data (i.e., where re-
sponses did not allow the calculation of a single switch
point for one or more delay periods given marked rever-
sals of directions). For the remaining 150 participants, k
values were estimated using MatLab scripts (Lau, 2011),
and the resulting k values were log transformed to re-
duce markedly positive skew as is typical for k estimates
(e.g., Alessi & Petry, 2003; Hariri et al., 2006).
Zero-order correlations showed that higher MMI
scores were associated with greater delay discounting
(i.e., less delay of gratification), r(150) = .20, p < .05 as
estimated using k. In addition to being positively associ-
ated with a greater discounting slope (k), MMI scores
were negatively correlated with the switch point estimate
at each of the seven delay intervals, indicating that those
with higher MMI scores were willing to take lower
amounts immediately instead of waiting, both at very
Fig. 1 a Mean Media Multitasking Index (MMI) scores as a function of number correct on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) in Study 1. b Mean
number of correct responses on the CRT for low media multitaskers (LMMs) and heavy media multitaskers (HMMs) in Study 1. c Mean number of
incorrect intuitive responses for LMMs and HMMs in Study 1. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean
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long delay periods of 1 or 5 years (all ps < .05).
As in Study 1, extreme groups were created based on
MMI scores of greater or less than 1 SD from the mean (the
23 HMMs had MMI scores greater than 6.81, and the 20
LMMs had MMI scores lower than 2.97). An independentsamples t test showed that HMMs (M = −2.37, SD = .82)
had significantly higher discounting rates (k slopes) than
LMMs (M = −2.90, SD = .86; t(41) = 2.03, p < .05, d = 0.62)
reflecting HMMs’ preference for immediate gratification
relative to LMMs’ (see Fig. 2a). Indeed, when mean switch
points were averaged across all delay periods, LMMs
Fig. 2 a Points represent the mean indifference point at each delay interval for heavy media multitaskers (HMMs) (high Media Multitasking Index
(MMI) score group depicted with open symbols) and low media multitaskers (LMMs) (low MMI score group depicted with filled symbols). Lines
represent the hyperbolic functions fitted to the data points for each group (dashed for HMMs and solid for LMMs). Note the lower indifference
points and greater rate of decay for HMMs compared to LMMs indicate a greater willingness to settle for a smaller reward so as to get it
immediately, reflecting a reduced ability to delay gratification. b Mean minimum number of dollars required to take the immediate reward
(switch point) averaged across delay periods for LMMs and HMMs in Study 2. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean
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later, whereas HMMs required only $56.43 CAD now to
forgo $100 CAD later, t(41) = 2.81, p < .05, d = 0.86
which reflects a meaningful, as well as a statistically sig-
nificant difference in what the two groups were willing
to take to get the reward immediately (see Fig. 2b).
Discussion
In Study 1, HMMs were less likely to provide the correct
answer to CRT questions and more likely to provide the
automatic/intuitive answer than LMMs. This provides
evidence that HMMs rely more on a fast and intuitive
system-1 processing style that can be efficient, but also
costly in terms of accuracy, rather than using the more
deliberate and effortful system-2 processing. Greatermedia multitasking was also associated with greater self-
reported impulsivity, supporting previous findings that
HMMs are more impulsive (Minear et al., 2013; Sanbon-
matsu et al., 2013). However, BIS scores (overall and
each of the subscales) were unrelated to CRT scores;
therefore, the relationship between MMI scores and
CRT scores held even when controlling for BIS scores,
suggesting that the CRT is not simply a behavioral meas-
ure of cognitive impulsivity.
A preference for more automatic and intuitive decision
making, at the expense of more reasoned and effortful deci-
sion making, could have substantial real-world decision-
making consequences, and has been shown to result in de-
cisions favoring immediate gratification (Frederick, 2005).
The results of Study 2 provide evidence that HMMs have a
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Indeed, visual comparison of the delay discounting func-
tions for HMMs and LMMs in Fig. 2 bears a striking simi-
larity to previous findings showing reduced delay of
gratification for those with various addictions (for example,
see the discounting functions for problem gamblers and
controls in Alessi & Petry, 2003). It appears that HMMs
have a reduced ability for self-regulation in order to forego
immediately gratifying rewards. This is consistent with the
view that media multitasking is related to higher self-
reported impulsivity and lower self-reported self-control
(Minear et al., 2013; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2013).
Why can’t they just put their phone down?
Previous studies have provided evidence that HMMs
have increased self-reported mind-wandering and more
everyday lapses of attention (Ralph et al., 2014), less top-
down goal-related attentional selectivity (e.g., Ophir
et al., 2009; Cain & Mitroff, 2011), greater self-reported
impulsivity (Minear et al., 2013; Sanbonmatsu et al.,
2013), reduced self-reported self-control (Minear et al.,
2013), and, as observed here, an increased reliance on fast
and automatic system-1 processing, and a reduced ability
to delay gratification. We suggest that instead of proactively
managing their approach to stimuli in the environment,
HMMs may be more reactive – a pattern that has also been
demonstrated in older-age participants (e.g., Braver &
Barch, 2002; Schmitt, Ferdinand, & Kray, 2014), and which
would be consistent with Loh and Kanai’s (2014) finding
that HMMs have reduced gray-matter density in the
anterior cingulate cortex relative to LMMs.
The direction of causality cannot be established here.
It is possible that individuals who prefer immediate
gratification are drawn towards media multitasking due
to the its immediately gratifying nature. It is also pos-
sible that frequent media multitasking instead, or also,
“trains the brain” to have a higher preference for imme-
diate rewards due to habituation to the immediately
gratifying nature of media multitasking.
Regardless of the reason for the association between
media multitasking and delay discounting, the present
results suggest that HMMs have a reactive decision-
making style that promotes current desires (money, ease
of processing) at the expense of accuracy and future re-
wards, providing empirical support for a hypothesis that
has probably run through many of our minds on occa-
sion when viewing others using media. Given that
greater delay discounting is related to substance misuse,
problematic gambling, overeating, and poor financial
management (see MacKillop et al., 2011 for a review),
the present results suggest that HMMs may be at risk
for these behaviors as well, and it would be interesting
to examine the frequency of these behaviors in LMMs
versus HMMs. Furthermore, more investigation of theassociation between media multitasking and impulsivity,
impaired delay of gratification, and system-1 thinking
may help us understand how to curb dangerous multi-
tasking trends with media, such as texting while driving.
For example, if drivers who text while driving are less
able to weight future consequences, such as harming
themselves or others, compared to the immediate outcome
of reading the text message, then this may suggest that
media campaigns focused on future consequences may not
be as effective for those most at risk for texting and driving.
Even more benign media multitasking behaviors can have
negative consequences, such as reduced academic or work-
place performance, or social faux pas, and understanding
the role of impaired delay of gratification and system-1
thinking in media multitasking may help us to understand
the motivations behind these behaviors.
Conclusions
Here, we observed that HMMs were more likely than
LMMs to endorse intuitive, but wrong, decisions on the
CRT indicating a greater reliance on quick and intuitive
‘system-1’ thinking and less reliance on slower and more
effortful ‘system-2’ thinking. Heavy media multitaskers
also displayed a reduced ability to delay gratification in a
delay discounting task. Heavy media multitaskers were
willing to take less money immediately relative to LMMs
who were more willing to wait for the larger delayed re-
ward. These results suggest that HMMs have a reactive
decision-making style that promotes current desires (ease
of processing, money) at the expense of accuracy and fu-
ture rewards. These findings highlight the potential for
HMMs to be at risk for problematic behaviors associated
with immediate gains and longer-term negative conse-
quences – behaviors such as substance abuse, overeating,
problematic gambling, and impulsive spending – and fur-
ther investigation of this association may suggest ways to
remediate undesirable media multitasking behaviors.
Endnotes
1Note that it is also possible, and indeed not infre-
quent, for participants to provide an answer that is in-
correct, but not intuitive. Therefore, intuitive answers
are not simply the difference between the total number
of questions and the number of correct answers.
2k is used here as it is the conventional dependent meas-
ure of choice in delay discounting studies. However, the
same pattern of results was observed when delay discount-
ing was estimated using an area under the curve measure
(see Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001) or when
simply calculating the mean switch point across all delay in-
tervals for each person. Indeed, once participants with in-
consistent switch points were removed using the Johnson
and Bickel (2008) criterion, these three measures were re-
lated to each other at r = .92 or better.
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BIS: Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11, Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995);
CRT: Cognitive Reflection Test (a measure of system-1 thinking, see Frederick,
2005); HMMs: Heavy media multitaskers (participants who score relatively
high on the MMI); LMMs: Light media multitaskers (participants who score
relatively low on the MMI); MMI: Media Multitasking Index (a measure of
media multitasking behavior, see Ophir, Nass, & Wagner, 2009)
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